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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16147, 16040, 
and 16019 
KENNETH SHARP, GEORGE 
CHRISTENSEN, and JAMES 
N. TUCKER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST.:'ITE:lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
~poellants Sharp and Christensen were charged by 
co~olaint and i~formation with theft of a motor vehicle, a 
·:islc;~ion o£ Ctah Coce An:-;otated § 76-6-40~ (1953), as amended, 
a:1d ~lth aiding the escape of a person from official custody, 
a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-310 (1953) as amended. 
Appellant Tucker was also charged with theft of a 
motor vehicle and with the crime of escape from official 
::c:stoc::, a violation of Ctah Code J'.,nnotated § 76-8-309 (1953), 
~p~cllants Sharp and C~ristensen appeal both of 
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their convictions. Appellant Tucker appeals his conviction 
for theft but does not challenge his conviction of escape 
from official custody. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial by jury before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft on August 3 and 4, 1978, appellants were 
found guilty as chargee. Each appellant was given two 
concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison to be served following completion of the 
sentences t~~ • ~ere currently serving. 
RELIE? SQUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the convictions 
and sentences of aopellants. 
ST.;n::tE:jT OF TP.I: F."-.CTS 
On .Z..pril 18, 1978, ar:,;~,ellar,t 7ucker ·A·as a prisoner 
in t~e ~ini~urn security co~po~nd of the Ctah State Prison. 
He was serving an i~determinate sentence of one to fifteen 
years for the cri~e of rape (R. at 139, State's Exhibit 2-5) 
and had not been paroled or pardoned (R. at 191, State's 
Exr.ibit 3-::i) . .:O.?;_:Jella:',ts S'"-,aro and Chri:ct<?n:cen v;ere also 
confined in minir,tuc. security at t!"".e ?riso~ :ollm,·ing felony 
convictions and 90-daj· presente:-.ce e·:.?tluatio:~ cc~r:-~lt~er,:.s 
(?. at 19 3, State's E::~'li::;._i ':.::: ~ s a:-::-1 C s 1. 
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left with another inmate named Brooks along a ditch on 
Prison property to carry out a work detail at about 1:00 
p.m. Appellant Tucker had on a blue shirt and headband. 
Appellant Sharp had an orange shirt stuck in his pocket 
and appellant Christensen had on an orange shirt (R. at 
206-209). 
At about 3:00 p.m., Prison Instructor Paul 
Christensen, who was supervising the work detail, noticed 
inmate Brooks walking alone toward the minimum security 
area of the Prison (R. at 211). Upon investigation, the 
shovels which had been issued to appellants were discovered, 
one lying at the end of the ditch, the other two where the 
men had begun working (R. at 211). After an unsuccessful 
attempt to locate appellants, Mr. Christensen notified Prison 
Cont~o1 that an escape had occurred (R. at 213). A head 
cc'-1:1t ·,.;as i:T"-cediate1y conducted and it 1,·as discovered that 
a;::;::e11ants v:ere, indeed, missing (R. at 224, 225). 
At about the same time, 3:00p.m. on April 18, 1978, 
two female employees of Riverton City were sitting in the 
citj cf~ices and noticed three men walking together (R. at 230). 
~~e ~en ~ore blue shirts and denim pants. One wore a headband. 
:o at 2~l-23:2). Riverton Police Chief, Leonard Smock, 
2lso sa~ the men and noted that one of them wore a turquoise 
He identified another as apDellant Christensen 
-3-
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Three men were also seen at about 3:00 p.m. as they 
walked in front of Sav More T.V., a business two buildings 
away from the Riverton City offices. (R. at 240). Again, 
all three were wearing blue shirts and one wore a headband. 
One man was again observed walking in front of Sav More, and 
shortly thereafter, people in the building heard a car startinc 
(R. at 241 and 249). ~'rc '-:arcia Ruark testified that she ran 
out in time to see her white 1971 Cadillac being driven away 
to the north (R. at 249) 
take the (R. at 250) 
She had not authorized anyone to 
She promptly notified the police 
(R. at 28'i). Police C~ie~ Smock and Officer Whipple ?Ot into 
two pollee cars and be;an a search for the ~issing vehicle. 
The car was quickly located and a chase began durina ~hich 
the vehicles reached speeds of 90 m.p.h. (R. at 286). Chie~ 
Smock noted that there were three occucants in the car, one 
with a headband a~d another with a turquoise shirt (R. at 287). 
The chase led to 3utterfie!d Ca~yon ~here the Cadillac was 
found abandoned in the road. T~o persons were headinc through 
the oak brush. Deputy Sheriff Curtis ~ielson 
testified that while he was searching the mountainside he 
apprehended ac~ellant Share hi~ing under a tree. M 
turquoise shirt \·.·c.s fo·Jnd '.-:ith hi:-;1 ro :;t 305-307\. 
into custody as C~r~st0~s~n ~:~~ tr· 1:- J._,_" ::. 'l - :;~ 
---1-
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brush (R. at 313). 
Larry Debillo had been driving in the area with 
his wife and had stopped at a roadblock conducted by prison 
officers. They gave him a flyer with a picture and descrip-
tion of appellant Tucker (R. at 255). As Mr. Debillo was 
driving toward Lark, Utah he saw appellant Tucker hitchhiking 
and picked him up (R. at 257-258). Mr. Debillo was armed 
(R. at 256). After driving for a while, Mr. Debillo took 
appellant Tucker into custody and sent his wife for the 
sheriff (R. at 259-261). 
Appellant Tucker testified for the defense and 
indicated that he had left the Prison work detail (R. at 340) 
anc had met appellants Christensen and Sharp in Riverton. 
He said he had been drinking (R. at 344). He claimed that 
later as ~e and appellant Sharp were walking along the road, 
a~pellant Christensen creve up in the white Cadillac. Tucker 
testi:ied that he and Sharp joined Christensen in the car 
and together they headed toward the Prison. However, they 
then decided to go for a ride. W~en the police began the 
c~ase 7ucker die not ask the others to stop the car because 
~e d~d not want the police to catch him (R. at 346 and 347). 
After deliberation,_ the jury found appellant Tucker 
• '• of ~heft and Escape from o~ficial custody and appellants 
s~arp and Christensen guilty of Theft and Aiding Escape ~R. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS SHARP ANI1 CHRISTENSEN I-JERE 
PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AIDING THE ESCAPE 
OF APPELLANT TUCKER. 
A 
THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANTS 
WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
ESCAPE/AIDI~G ESCAPE STATUTES. 
Appellants Starp 3nd Christensen contend that their 
conduct was not sufficient to constitute a violation of Utah 
Code )\r,r_ot=.tec § 76-8-310 (1953), as amended, v:hich provides: 
perso~ is quilty of an offense if: 
a) He =.i:':s J.nother person to escape 
from official custody:. 
(2) An offense under this section is a 
felony of the second degree if: 
b) A person to whon the aid . is 
given is a prisoner confined in 
~~e sta~e prison. 
Escape from Official Custocy lS prescribed by rtah Coce ;..nn. 
(1) A person is guilty of cscaFe if he 
escapes fron official custody. 
(2) The offense is a felony of the second 
degree if:. 
b) The actor escapes frorr confinement 
in the state prison. 
P\· --l~·= i~.c 
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be aiding an escape, appellants argue that there was no 
proof of the necessary acts or intent to constitute the 
crime charged. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the 
cases cited by appellants reveals that appellants' inter-
pretation of the Utah statutes is unduly restrictive and 
that conviction in this matter is consistent with the law 
of aiding escape throughout the country. 
In Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566 (5th Cir. 
1918), the defendant had been convicted on two counts. 
Each count involved a seperate portion of a federal statute. 
The first count charged that the defendant had aided an 
escaped prisoner. The facts indicated that the defendant 
had allo~ed an escapee to hide in his home and then sent 
hii"l on his ~;·ay. The escapee had been free for some days 
~c~ore the defendant rendered any aid. The Court ruled 
~~at conviction for aiding the escape was improper but 
not:eC.: 
This conclusion does not effect 
(sic) the conviction on the second 
count charging that the defendant 
harbored and concealed. (Id. at 568) 
The defendant's sentence ~as affirmed. 
L:r:lif::e the L'nited States Code c.s applied in Orth, 
c_ -~, the Ctah Code does not contain a statute proscribing 
ac~ of ~artoring or aidino an escaped prisoner. Moreover, 
t ,.-_ c= uc-o:oe c" conduct undertaken by all appellants in this 
-7-
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matter indicates an on-going act. Within the space of a 
few hours appellants walked away from the prison, took a 
car and attempted to elude the police. There was ample 
evidence from which the jury could and did infer an on-
going attempt to elude authorities and complete an escape 
to freedom. Given the locale of the prison, it is clear 
that no escapee can get far without some transportation. 
Unlike Orth, where ~ne esc'l._t:;ee had been at large for 
several days before the defendant gave aid, appellants 
Sharp and Christensen left the prison at or near the same 
time as ·r~ellan~ Tucker and all three were actively 
corroboratlng in a atte~pt to avoid police a very short 
time t~ereafter. l·:~ile tne narrm,· reading of "escape" "'·as 
appropriate in Orth where the conduct of the defendant 
remained criminal under another more applicable portion of 
the same statute, in ~tah there is no specific alternate 
provision. The lack of such a provision indicates that t~e 
escape and aiding escape statutes should be read broadly 
enough to include help rendered during the entire attempt 
by the escapee to place himself beyond the reach of legal 
authori::y. Apoellants Sharp and Christensen ~ere helping 
Appellant Tucker avoid re-capture ~ithin an hour of ~hen 
they ~ere all d~s=overed ~issin0 fro~ the sa:10 ~or}: d0~ail 
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at the prison. It would be unduly restrictive to rule 
that aid given so soon after a departure from the prison 
as part of such a clearly continuous course of events was 
not aiding the escape of appellant Tucker. 
Other authority cited by appellants supports a 
more broad reading of the Utah statutes. In State v. Jones,-
36 P.2d 530 (Idaho 1934), a prisoner was working outside 
the jail under the suoervision of a deputy. Although he 
was supposed to be delivering coal, he went, instead, to the 
house of a friend with whom he had left some money he had 
stolen. His friend, the defendant, gave him some money 
and sent him on his way. Although the court cited People v. 
Quijada, 53 Cal..ZI.op 39, 199 P. 854 (1921) to state the narrow 
ce:initicn of escape, the court held that the escapee was 
in the lawful custody of the deputy when he was assisted 
by the defendant (36 P.2d at 531), e~en though he had clearly 
cone where he was not authorized to go. The defendant's 
conviction for aiding escape was affirmed. Just as in Jones, 
the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen in this matter 
were rendered contemporaneously with Appellant Tucker's 
escape an~ made it possible for appellant Tucker 
~:J :_Jlace '1imself comfortably beyond the immediate reach of 
2_.~ho::_-it~·. 
State ex rel. Farrior v. Faulk, 136 So. 601 (Fla., 
-9-
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1931), cited by appellants, did not involve an aiding escape 
charge. The escapee had left the jail and had gone into a 
neighboring county. The sheriff of that county arrested 
him and sought expenses and transportation costs from the 
original county. The court held that the escapee was an 
escaped prisoner and that the sheriff was able to arrest and 
was entitled to costs. ~~~ rcl~ng was clearly made in the 
interests of orderly and efflcient police work. There was 
absolutely no indication of how the court might have ruled 
upon the ~us~~ ~n of when help given to an escapee may 
properly be termed as aidi~g the escape. 
In People v. Quintero, 67 Mich. App. 481, 241 ~.W. 
2d 251 (1976), the question of aiding escape was, again, not 
an issue. It was not clear in that case whether the escapee-
defenda~t had been found off or on the prison ground. The 
court said that he "escapes if he re'n.oves himself :rom the 
imposed restraint over his person and ':clition." (Id. at 252\. 
The evidence in the instant matter indicates that appellants 
were all trying to do just that-remove themselves from 
restraint over their persons and volition. They were discove! 
missing at about 3:00 p.m. and were seen driving a~ay in a 
car not their c~n within ~he half hour. If the~· ~ere ever 
separated, it ~as =~~ a '.·~~·.· s~c~t ~i~e. ~ ?e~~ectl~· acc~~tat 
logical in:':erence :or the jcry to ha··e ~a=ce ·.-:c .. s t~c.t all 
-20-
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appellants left the prison together. In any event, in 
light of the absence of a harboring statute in Utah the 
narrow view that one may aid an escape only by acting 
before or as the escapee leaves the narrowest physical 
confines of his confinement would 'be unjust. In this 
case appellants acted in concert during or very shortly 
after their departure from prison property to make good 
their getaway. The time interval was so short as to make 
consecutive events of walking away, stealing the car, 
and eluding police one continuous transaction. 
B 
THE NECESSARY INTENT ELEMENT 
I~ AS SHOI'i'N BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Appellants contend that the necessary intent element 
was not shown and that their conviction was therefore defec-
tive. Appellants correctly note that where a specific intent 
is not provided for a crime, a c~lpable mental state is 
required, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953), as amended. 
However, it is well established that criminal intent may 
be inferred and need not be shown by direct evidence. See 
State v. Minousis, 64 Utah 206 at 211-212, 228 P. 574 (1924) 
a~:d State v. Kazda, 15 C.2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 at 488 (1964). 
Appellants contend ·that the intent element for 
aidins escape must be the same as for escape under Utah Code 
,~.:-:n. c; 76-2-202 (1953), as amended. Even if they are correct, 
-11-
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it does not follow from the evidence that the jury could 
not have concluded that appellants Sharp and Christensen 
did not intend to effectuate an escape when they acted as 
they did. In Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873) the defendants 
were charged with arson for burning a hole in the jail 
floor. The elements of arson required that the fire be 
set for an illegal ~JPcase The court found such purpose 
in that the defendants w~re ~iding each other to escape. 
All three appellants here were confined in the Gtah State 
Priso;--,. reJ all did their best, both together and then, 
later, 2~art, tc e·:ade re-=aoture. Their tactic of running 
::.:--. ci:c,c. "'t directions after abanconing the car increased 
the chances that one or more mig~t ?Et a\\a~· ~ro~ ~hich the 
jury could infer an intent to aid each other in their 
.:..s i!l. LJke, c~pellc:-'."':5 3ctc:=: ir: ::c>r:cert to 
achieve an escane. 
In State v I-~avarro, ~6~ '-'-· lC13 (.l-1ainc, l9J:.?), the 
court noted that "aiding a:1 esca::Je is a:1y c\·e:ct act \·:'-',ich is 
intended to assist an attencted or conpleted departure of 
a prisoner from lawful custody before he is discharced by 
d~J.e process of l:J.\·:. 11 {I,:. 2t 104). 
l - _ .... ' 
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and Sharp after leaving the Prison) , they clearly aided him 
in his further attem~t to evade authority. All three acted 
together in evading re-capture. The intent to assist each 
other, as noted above, is clearly inferrable from their 
actions. 
Finally, State v. Cooper, 113 N.J.Super 34, 272 
A.2d 557 (1971), supports this conclusion. In that case 
the defendant started a jail riot during which two prisoners 
escaped. He was found guilty of aiding their escape. The 
court stated that it was not necessary to show actual par-
ticication in the escape or any intent to aid the escape. 
The court said the defendant should have known that his 
acts could create a possibility for escape and affirmed 
t~e ca~~iction. T~e facts here are much stronger. The acts 
c~ ~~;ella~ts S~arp and Christensen clearly went to aiding 
a~pel~a~t Tucker to ~ake his esca~e complete. They knew 
T~cker ~as, like themselves, incarcerated in the prison and 
1t was clearly in~errable that they knew and intended that 
their actions would create a possibility for Tucker's escape. 
Appellants contend further that there was no 
e· ~dc~ce of a specific intent to aid appellant Tuc~er's 
They s•·· that they, appellants Sharp and Christensen, 
~re c·-:l enca;1ng in a Class B ~isdemeanor escape when 
-13-
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appellant Tucker happened along. By so arguing, they 
concede that escape is an on-going crime since, according 
to appellant Tucker's testimony, he met his co-defendants 
outside the prison. But even more important is the fact 
that from the moment the evidence puts the three together 
in Riverton there was clearly a common intent and effort 
to avoid re-capture. They were hardly "clean away" when 
they were on fo0t i~ ~iverton in prison clothing. They 
were in a car, running away from the police within less than 
an hour of when they were reported missing at the prison. 
T':co-- --ere all co::-uritt2_ng the sar.<e physical c.cts--the only 
difference bet:l-een the Class B Misdemeanor of appellants 
S~ar? and Chris~ensen and the second degree felony of 
appellant Tucker was the technical status of the men at: 
the prison. Clearly the ~Jry could have inferre~ an intent 
to corr~·it the crime of ai:'Oing the escaoe of appellant Tucker 
on behalf of aooellan~s Sharp and Christensen. This conclusic 
is supoorted by the holding of the court in State v. Stark, 
490 P.2 511 (Or.J..pp., 19/l) cited b;,- appellants at p.ll. 
In that case the defendant and several of his friends had 
picked up two hitchhikers. The hi~chhikers were rotbed end 
defendant contended "that to find ':ir-, cuilty o!' the unarr,ed 
-' 
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held that the following instruction was proper: 
It is sufficient if the defendant, 
William Gerald Stark . . was oresent 
when the robbery was committed,- and 
acquiesced therein, with a common 
criminal intent or purpose. 
All three appellants were escaping from authority. 
They were doing it together and were acting in such a way 
as to aid each other. This was clearly shown by the evidence 
and the verdicts were proper. 
c 
THE RULE OF STATE V. SHONDEL 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
Appellants contend that under the case of State 
\". Shondel, 22 C.2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969) and this Court's 
~ore recent affirmations of the rule of that case, they were 
i~properly charged and sentenced. Respondent respectfully 
submits that appellants have misread Shondel. In Shondel 
and the cases ~hich followed, State v. Fair,23 U.2d 34, 456 
P.2d 168 (1969); Ramrnell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); 
and State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978), the concern 
~as always with two statutes creating the same crime but 
specifying separate penalties. In Shondel, possession of 
~SD was prohibited in two statutes. One statute made the 
cr1me a ~isjemeanor and another made it a felony. Similar 
~roblems were posed in the subsequent cases cited above. 
-15-
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A fundamental difference between those cases and the matter 
at hand is that the defendants in those cases could not 
have been charged with or convicted of violating both statutes. 
The court had to make a choice as to which statute to proceed 
under. In this case the supposedly conflicting statutes 
proscribe escape and aiding escape. In aiding appellant 
Tucker's escape, appellants Sharp and Christensen committed 
a second degree :Z<= -;.c:::,. ln effectuating their own escape, 
appellants Sharp and Christensen committed a Class B ~1isdemeanc 
It is well-established that within one episode or continuous 
cours~ G~ conduct an actor may commit more than one crime, 
Utah Coie .J.nn. § 76-l-402 (1953), as amended. 11oreover, it 
has tee~ ~ade clear by this Court that when two crimes are 
COI11.'Tii ttea, neither of ~-,·hic'1 may be tried 'A'i thin the same 
court, that they may be tried separately. See State v. 
Cooley, 5"75 P.2d 693 (Utah ~918) • ..:here t'1e cefendant had 
commi tte·d three offenses \·:-'- t'!in the sarc.e course of conduct. 
~wo of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and one was 
an indictable misdemeanor. The Court held that separate 
prosecutions in the District Court and the Justice Court 
Conviction of aidinc the escape o~ arpellant 
Tucker did not preclude t~e state from fu~ther ~rcsecution 
C·f appell_a:ct's SharD ac.::i C".ristens n foe· tl~e cri.>~ •:f escane. 
-. (-
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crimes. The fact that one act creates two separate criminal 
results does not prohibit the prosecution of both crimes. 
Under Shondel when achievement of the same criminal result 
may result in differing penalties, the lesser penalty must 
be imposed. No such choice is mandated in this case. 
Appellants were, therefore, properly charged and convicted. 
Their verdicts and sentences should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS l'i'ERE PROPERLY CONVICTED 
OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE 
AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
AN INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF TEMPORARILY DEPRIVING AN 
0\'i'NER OF A VEHICLE. 
Appellants concede the establishment of all the 
ele~ents of the crime of theft of an operable motor vehicle 
except for intent to permanently deprive (Appellants' Brief 
o. -c p. 18) . They contend that the evidence was ambiguous 
o~ that element a~d that the trial court committed error 
1~ not i~structing the jury on the lesser included offense 
of joyriding, as they requested. Respondent submits that 
the evidence clearly indicated that the offense of appellants 
was not joyriding and that they were guilty of the offense 
o~ which they were convicted. 
Ctah Code .".nnotated § -;"6-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
c ~- 0\" i s : 
.". nerson commits theft if he 
-1/-
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obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 76-6-401(3) (1953), as amended provides 
further: 
Purpose to deprive means to have 
the conscious object: To withhold pro-
perty permanently or for so extended 
a period or to use under such circum-
stances that a substantial portion of 
its eccno~ic value, or of the use and 
benefit ~her~of, would be lost; 
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 at 218 (Utah 1976) this 
Court held that: 
The intent to steal or unlawfully 
deprive the rightful owners of their 
property can be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances 
testified to by the ~itnesses. 
In State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 at 812 (1970) 
this Court quoted State v. Johnson, 112 U. 130, 185 P.2d 
738 (1947) to say: 
That the defendant is entitled to have 
the jury instructed on his theory of the 
case if there is any substantial evidence 
to justify giving such an instruction. 
(EmDhasis in original). 
In State v. Doughert~ 550 P.2d 175 at 176-177 (Utah 1976) 
this Court further noted that an instruction on a lesser 
included offense say be refused ''if the prosecution has ~et 
its burde~ of proof on ~he greater offense, ~nd t~ere is no 
evidence te:1ding to reduce the greater offense. II 
-lS-
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The evidence in this matter clearly demonstrated 
that appellants intent was to permanently deprive the owner 
of her automobile. Ap?ellants contend that because there 
1'as no significant damage done to the vehicle and that the 
vehicle was recovered only a short distance from the point 
of taking within a relatively short time that-the court 
must necessarily have concluded that appellants only intended 
to make temporary use of the vehicle. While the facts noted 
by appellants are in the record, they do not present a 
complete picture of what transpired and should not be viewed 
out of context. The only reason the car was recovered 
quickly with minimal damage was because police reacted almost 
i:nmediately to the theft. The automobile was abandoned after 
a high-speed chase (R. at 294). The fact of temporary 
~ossession does not and should not be taken to indicate an 
intent to possess temporarily. On the contrary, the fact 
that appellants were escaped prisoners trying to elude re-
caotu~e indicated clearly that they had no intention of 
returning the car to its owner after a short drive in the 
:-.e i ghtorhood. Appellant Tucker's testimony that they were 
cnly trying to return to prison with the car is totally 
inconsistant with all the other evidence. If they were 
returning to custody, why did they flee from the police both 
in the car and then, later, on foot? Moreover, even if 
-19-
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Tucker's testimony were believable, there was no indication 
that appellants would have done anything to see that the 
owner of the automobile would have recovered the vehicle 
within a short period of time, if ever. 
Several cases from other jurisdictions are instructiv 
on this point. In People v. Hutchins, 20 Cal Rptr. 497 
(Cal. App., 1962) the defendant was charged with grand theft 
of an automob~le. He had rented a car from a Hertz outlet 
in Long Beach but had not returned the car on the agreed date. 
The car was, in fact, left abandoned on or near another 
Bectz lot at the Los Angeles airport. The court held that 
the evidence ~as sufficient to prove that the defendant took 
t~e car with the intent to deprive the owner of title to and 
possession of the vehicle. 
I:1 ?.obinson v. CorEmom;ealth, 190 Va. 134, 56 S.E.2d 
367 (1949) the defendant a:1d others broke into a car dealershi: 
and took a new ?ord automobile. The car was found several 
The defendant was convicted of theft and conte~de 
on appeal that he was guilty of unauthorized use, not theft. 
The court held: 
In the case at bar the conduct 
of the de£8ndant negati\~es an~· iCea 
that ~Je ir.":ende~ to C·2pri':e the Oh"ner 
of the car t~mpcraril~·. ~e ~id no act 
~rior ~o his ar~est tc l:ldicote tl1 t 
o·v:ne~. On t~e o~ner h~n~, ~is con uct 
....:'-' 
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and testimony disclose that he intended 
to deprive the owner of the car perma-
nently. This is the only conclusion 
that can be reached from the evidence. 
The circumstances under which the car 
was taken, and his actions regarding 
it afterwards, including his abandoning 
it in a public highway, show clearly 
that he was guilty of the offense of 
larceny and not of unauthorized use. 
We do not think that the instruction 
offered was proper, and the court did 
not commit error in refusing it. 
Id. at 372. 
So also the facts in this case would not have 
justified an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
joyriding. Appellants did nothing to indicate that they 
had any intent other than to permanently deprive the owner 
of possession. They ran away from the police. They abandoned 
the autor;)obile. They drove the car in a dangerously reckless 
:nanner. (R. at 290,294, 308,312). They were escaped prisoners. 
Apoellants should not benefit fro:n the quick and efficient 
action of the Riverton Police in that an offense otherwise 
a felony is reduced to a misdemeanor because they were quickly 
aporehended. 
APpellant relies upon State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 
(Ctah 1977). However, that case is distinguishabla in that 
there the Co~rt held that the jury was ~roperly instructed 
on both the creater and lesser of~enses because the evidence 
o~ intent was clearly in doubt. The defendant had presented 
-21-
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evidence which tended to negate an intent to permantly 
deprive. In this case the only possible evidence of such 
a nature was the un-supported, incredible assertions of 
appellant Tucker that the car had been taken to return to 
prison. Even that testimony does not indicate any intent to 
return the automobile to the owner, at best, it simply indicate 
that the appellants may not have intended to travel a long 
distance. The car was recovered and returned quickly but not 
through the actions of appellants. 
In summary, an instruction on the lesser-included 
offense of joyriding was not justified in this case since no 
reasonable view of the evidence would have supported a convict: 
of such a~ offense. ~oreover, the intent of appellants to 
permantly deprive the owner of the stolen automobile was 
clearly and properly inferrable from the evidence. The 
convictions were proper a~d should be affirmed. 
PCI:\T III 
SINCE E.:C,CH .1\PPELL.<;>-.;T ?.ECEI\'ECJ Ti·IO 
EQUAL CONCURRE:\T SDlTE:\CES, A~ Hl-
PROPER CONVICTIO~ ON O~E SENTENCE 
IS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Utah Code A:>n. §76-3-401(7) (1953) as amended provid; 
that whenever two equal, concurrent sente~ces are imposed, 
''::he~' s~"J.all lTierge into one sentence. ' 1 I~ the instc~t ~atter, 
all ap?ellants received ~~-:~ eq~2l, co~cu~~e~t s~n~~nces. ~he 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
practical effect is that each appellant has received one 
sentence on two alternate theories of conviction. 
Appellant Tucker does not challenge his conviction 
of escape in this appeal. Hence, even if the Court finds 
that the conviction for theft of an automobile was defective, 
appellant Tucker's sentence should stand unchanged. 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were convicted of 
both aiding the escape of Tucker and of theft of an automobile. 
In order for their sentences to be altered, this Court must 
find that both of their convictions were defective. If the 
court finds that only one conviction is defective, their 
sentences should also remain unchanged. This is the same 
circumstance which faced the court in Orth v. United States, 
sc:pra, v:herein the defendant had been convicted upon two 
counts, one of which was held improper. The defendant's 
sentence was left unaltered since conviction on the proper 
count alone produced the penalty. 
To capsulize, a finding by this Court that the 
theft convictions were improper, by itself, would indicate 
harmless error since the convictions of escape and aiding 
escape would remain unchanged and the sentences of appellants 
would remain the same. Moreover, a finding that the aiding 
escape convictions alone were defective would produce the 
sa::-.e reslll t. Unless this Court finds for appellants on all 
-23-
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issues raised in this appeal, any error noted is harmless 
error since the sentences of appellants would not be altered. 
In any event, any finding of this Court on the issues raised 
on behalf of appellant Tucker can have no bearing upon his 
conviction and sentence since he does not challenge his 
conviction of escape. Any error with respect to appellant 
Tucker is, therefore, harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants Sharp and Christensen were properly 
charged with and convicted of aiding the escape of appellant 
A proper interpretation of the relevant statutes 
indicates that the actions of appellants Sharp and Christensen 
went to aiding appellant Tucker to further his crime of escape 
The fact that, in the same criminal episode, appellants Sharp 
and Christensen also co~uitted the crime of escape does not 
bar their conviction and/or punishment for the crime of aidinc 
the escape of Tucker. 
All appellants were clearly guilty of theft of a 
motor vehicle and not joyriding. No reasonable view of the 
evidence would have supported a conviction of joyriding and 
the court properly refJsed an instruction on the lesser crime. 
Appellants' intent to steal the car was inferrable from their 
acts and the circ~8sta~ccs of the ta~~ina. 
Finall~·, e•Jen i~ this Co~rt shculd ~ind :or appella~ 
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on some but not all of the issues raised in this appeal, 
the error must be considered harmless since the convictions 
and sentences of appellants Sharp and Christensen remain 
essentially unchanged unless they prevail on all issues 
raised. In any event, appellant Tucker has not challenged 
his escape conviction and a finding that his conviction for 
automobile theft was defective would not alter his sentence 
and should be regarded as harmless. 
The convictions and sentences of appellants should 
be sustained as proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attor~eys for Respondent 
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